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Abstract It is widely acknowledged that human rights law (hereafter, HRL) and inter-
national criminal law (hereafter, ICL) share core normative features. Yet, the literature has
not yet reconstructed this underlying basis in a systematic way. In this contribution, I lay
down the basis of such an account. I first identify a similar tension between a ‘‘moral’’ and
a ‘‘political’’ approach to the normative foundations of those norms and to the legitimate
role of international courts (hereafter, ICs) and tribunals adjudicating those norms. With a
view to bring the debate forward, I then turn to the practices of HRL and international
criminal law (hereafter, ICL) to examine which of those approaches best illuminates some
salient aspects of the adjudication of ICs. Finally, I argue that the political approach best
explains the practice. While each preserves a distinct role, HRL and ICL both establish the
basic conditions for the primary subject of international law (HRL and ICL, for the purpose
of this article), namely the state, to legitimately govern its own subjects constructed as free
and equal moral agents.
Keywords International law  Human rights law  International criminal
law  Human rights theory  Criminal law theory
1 Introduction
Two conceptions of the law’s appropriate content and justification have polarized the
debate on the normative foundations of the post-war international legal order in recent
years. On the one hand, there is the view that international law embodies a distinctively
universal, substantive, and independently captured moral order. Echoing the long tradition
of natural law, this view argues that the role of international courts (hereafter, ICs) ulti-
mately amounts to specifying this antecedent layer of reasoning. On the other hand, there is
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the view that, given reasonable disagreement over the content and limits of law, the basis
for establishing the legitimate authority of international law is whether it can be justifiable
to its ultimate subjects (individuals) construed as free and equal moral agents. Viewed
through this lens, the role of international law and ICs is to help establish the conditions
under which their primary subjects, namely states, can legitimately govern their own
subjects, namely free and equal moral agents, without appealing to a comprehensive ethical
view.
Two particular areas illustrate this distinction. In human rights theory (hereafter, HRT),
the promoters of the so-called ‘‘moral,’’ ‘‘ethical’’ or ‘‘orthodox’’ conception firmly bind
the very purpose of HRT to the task of explaining what ‘‘human’’ means (Griffin 2008;
Tasioulas 2015). Unsurprisingly, the defenders of this approach neither articulate the
principled role nor reconstruct the actual practice of ICs (or domestic courts adjudicating
international law). This is because, for the moral camp, human rights law (hereafter, HRL)
embodies a distinctively universal status or value captured solely by substantive moral
reasoning—one that explains what makes HRL distinct from its domestic analogue
(constitutional law). In contrast, the political approach suggests that the role of HRL—
more precisely the role of ICs or constitutional/supreme courts adjudicating HRL—is to
operate a ‘‘test of public reason’’ (Kumm 2015) following Rawlsian principles of legiti-
macy (Rawls 1971). On this view, ICs play a crucial legitimacy-enhancing role that pre-
cisely excludes substantive moral reasoning to specify the appropriate content and limits of
HRL.
In international criminal law theory (hereafter, ICLT), some argue that international
crimes distinguish the class of wrongs that violate the status of ‘‘dignity’’ (Renzo 2012).
Analogous to HRT, this status is identified solely by moral reasoning and not only
determines the content and limits of international crimes but also derives the legitimate
role of international criminal tribunals, as we shall see. In contrast to HRT, however, the
principled and non-consequentialist role of (international) criminal tribunals of calling
offenders to account—following Antony Duff’s seminal account of criminal responsibility
qua answerability—is clearly articulated. Unlike domestic trials, which embody the status
of citizenship and its political-institutional community, international trials embody a
moral-universal community to which offenders are called to account. The political camp,
in turn, contends that the qualifying clauses of international crimes—the so-called ‘‘cha-
peaux’’ restricting the context of their commission (Haque 2012)—point to the particular
role of state or state-like agents as the relevant class of (potential) perpetrators of inter-
national crimes and the distinctive responsibilities they hold as such. On this view, the
relevant community of international crimes is a community of responsible states (Zysset
2016b).
This schematic distinction between the ‘‘moral’’ and the ‘‘political’’ suggests that across
the multiple positive and analytical distinctions one can construct between HRL and ICL,
the same normative frameworks are at play. Yet, a cross-examination of those fields
remains notoriously absent from the predominant literature. What is more, this distinction
has developed without paying close attention to the fast-developing practice of ICs and
therefore to the question of the kind of reasoning (moral or political) to which those courts
predominantly appeal. I suggest complementing the literature on those two fronts. First,
how and to what extent do normative debates in HRT and ICLT mirror each other, and
what does the mirror exactly reflect? Second, which of the two approaches best explains
the practice of ICs? Paying more attention to judicial practice is based on two interrelated
premises. On the one hand, given their growing caseload and the highly open-ended
character of treaty provisions, ICs have progressively asserted their domain of authority.
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On the other hand, there is more and more evidence that ICs have played this law-
specifying role with little help from conventional (positivist) methods of international
adjudication. The two premises converge in raising the question of legitimacy: Which
normative considerations underpin the ICs’ reasoning and what do those considerations
change to their claim to legitimate authority?
This paper aims to remedy this deficit in three steps. In Sect. 2, I start by showing that
the normative approaches outlined above (the moral and the political) transcend the
conventionally distinct fields of HRT and ICLT. I explain in more detail to what the
distinction analogously applies. Indeed, the distinction preserves the notions of rights and
crime (e.g., an interest-based theory of rights for HRT or an ‘‘answerability’’ model of
crimes for ICLT). Rather, the moral/political distinction concerns a sub-set of rights/
wrongs that is subject to an extra-territorial regime, that is, a regime that confers juris-
diction to ICs for the adjudication and/or enforcement of those norms. In this sense,
‘‘moral’’ and ‘‘political’’ concern the ultimate reasons for upholding this particular regime,
rather than the archetypal function that those two bodies of law operate across the
domestic/international divide. The moral relies on a distinctive values or status determined
by substantive moral reasoning—a form of moral foundationalism, whereas the political
points to the distinctive role of public authorities (states or state-like agents, domestic, or
international) and the ethically neutral reasons those authorities should invoke to ground
those norms, specify their content, and settle disputes.
It must be clear from the outset that I do not take a stand on which framework should
ultimately prevail. Rather, I reconstruct two overarching conceptions that both have the
resources to build a unifying account of international law. Then, in Sect. 3, I test those two
approaches against selected practices of ICs. In the HRL context, I explore the propor-
tionality test of the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter, the ECtHR). The ECtHR
not only puts more weight on political freedoms (e.g., expression and reunion) over per-
sonal freedoms (e.g., privacy and religion)—most clearly, when those two groups of rights
are in conflict in the proportionality test; it also relies on distinctively democratic con-
siderations to justify the grounds, content, and limits of the prevailing rights and duties. In
the ICL context, I examine how the International Criminal Court (hereafter, ICC) and
Special Tribunals have defined the content and limits of the category of crimes against
humanity. I show that ICs not only restrict this category to agents who exercise a state or
state-like form of control or authority prior to (and that enables) the crimes; they also point
in their reasoning to the distinctive role of political authorities as neutral guarantors of the
basic security of their subjects. Both HRL and ICL seem therefore to deploy various
aspects of the political approach.
Finally, in Sect. 4, I zoom out and articulate a specification of the political approach that
can simultaneously illuminate the two practices. I contend that ICs offer reasons to their
subjects (states and individuals) that help render the relation of authority between them
legitimate in conditions of reasonable disagreement. I understand ‘‘legitimacy’’ as ‘‘a
halfway along a spectrum between legal validity and justice: stronger than that of validity
because it confers some moral authority upon a norm, but weaker than that of justice
because reasonable people can disagree about the justness of a particular norm’’ (Sadurski
2015, p. 404). The need for political equals to govern themselves despite reasonable
disagreement is found at different stages of the political process. The practices of HRL and
ICL capture only two basic stages of that kind. Treating subjects as political equals in the
former case (HRL) requires grounding, defining, and limiting those rights based on their
status of equal membership in their political community. Treating them on such terms in
the latter case (ICL) requires not advancing a comprehensive view of what those norms
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(their violations) exactly attack but focuses on who can be liable for violations and who has
jurisdiction over those criminal acts.
2 The Moral/Political Divide in Human Rights Theory and International
Criminal Law Theory
The first step of the paper is to explain how the moral and the political approaches have
structured the debate on the normative foundations of international law across the positive
and conceptual specificities of HRL and ICL. Surprisingly, the two corresponding bodies
of normative literature (HRT and ICLT) have been developing independently from each
other (with a few notable exceptions, such as Renzo 2012). This may be due to regret-
table intra-disciplinary boundaries within (the philosophy of) international law and polit-
ical theory. Hence this section aims at showing that the moral and the political approaches
similarly pervade the emerging fields of HRT and ICLT while similarly neglecting the role
and practices of ICs. It thereby helps identify the challenges that the article subsequently
tackles.
Suggesting a cross-examination of the debates in HRT and ICL supposes being clear on
what can be cross-examined. Indeed, the moral and political approaches do not alter the
underlying notions of right and crime that HRT and ICLT respectively specify. Following
a broad Razian interest-based account of rights (Raz 1986; Tasioulas 2010), HRT aims to
offer an (approximate) account of the distinctive interest(s) sufficient to hold others—in the
particular case of HRL, all public authorities—to be under duties. While the specification
of interest(s) and duty-holder(s) requires normative theorizing, the notion of rights itself
remains stable. As Besson formulates, ‘‘the fundamental nature of the protected interests
will have to be determined by reference to the context and time rather than established
once and for all’’ (Besson 2012, p. 232). The moral/political distinction I construct hence
intervenes only at this specification stage. Similarly, following a broadly Duffian account
of criminal responsibility (Duff 2007), ICLT aims to account for to the distinctively public
wrong(s) of ICL violations and to identify the relevant community in the name of which
ICs can legitimately call wrongdoers to account. Further, ‘‘moral’’ and ‘‘political’’ do not
alter the basic function of rights and crime either. The former defines the scope of indi-
vidual freedoms vis-a`-vis public authorities—a function already regulated by constitutional
law. Similarly, ICLT preserves the criminal law’s basic function of coercively intervening
on behalf of individuals for committing publicly recognized wrongs—a function already
regulated by domestic criminal law. Here again, what makes HRL and ICL distinctive is
the extra-territorial dimension of their regime.
This article first aims to show that similar resources of philosophical theorizing—more
precisely, a moral/political divide—are at play within those fixed conceptual and func-
tional boundaries. More precisely, the moral approach fills the gap by appealing to a form
of moral foundationalism. On this view, the legitimate authority of ICs is to a significant
extent derivative of an independent and substantive elucidation of what those norms
protect. It therefore concentrates on the right-holder. This elucidation may require radical
reforms of the conventional lists of rights and crimes in international law. The political
approach, in contrast, focuses on the principled role of public authorities and the conditions
of their legitimate rule over individuals. This view is more attentive both to the preemi-
nence of pluralism and disagreement in law and politics and to the fact that states hold
primary responsibility for upholding those norms. It thereby focuses on the duty-holder.
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2.1 Human Rights Theory
Let me now explicate and illustrate the distinction in the context of HRT. The tenants of
the moral approach, on the one hand, argue that the very point of a normative theory of
human rights is to account for the claim that human rights are those rights we have just in
virtue of being human. As Renzo states in a recent article, the moral approach is ‘‘primarily
interested in the question of which important moral rights can be attributed to human
beings simply in virtue of their human nature’’ (Renzo 2015, p. 128). One prominent
example of that sort is Griffin’s influential argument that human rights protect the capacity
for normative agency (or ‘‘personhood’’). As Griffin explains, ‘‘anyone who has the
capacity to identify the good, whatever the extent of the capacity and whatever its sources,
has what I mean by a conception of a worthwhile life; they have ideas, some of them
reliable, about what makes a life better or worse’’ (Griffin 2008, p. 24). Griffin takes
‘‘human rights’’ as speaking for a distinctive and fundamental moral status—it fills a
vacuum in our moral repertoire—whose elucidation requires substantive and independent
moral reasoning. This is why Griffin almost exclusively focuses on the features of the
right-holder—a concentration that has provoked the skepticism of rights theorists pointing
to a neglect of correlative duties (Raz 2010; Tasioulas 2010; Besson 2012).
One implication of the moral approach is the derivative role of the law and the insti-
tutions (ICs or national courts) adjudicating HRL treaties and conventions. In Griffin’s
account, for instance, personhood is sufficient to derive the rights enshrined in ‘‘most of the
conventional lists of human rights’’ (Griffin 2008, p. 33): life, prohibition of torture,
security of person, political decision, free expression, assembly, free press, worship,
education, and minimum provision. This being said, Griffin does consider the applicability
of his abstract account. While acknowledging that personhood ‘‘is often not up to fixing
anything approaching a determinate enough line for practice’’ (Griffin 2008, p. 37), he
elaborates on ‘‘practicalities,’’ which explain how personhood may be endangered under
specific circumstances. Yet, this specification cannot precede the independent identifica-
tion of personhood. The same is true of conflicts of rights: ‘‘virtually everyone would agree
that an important part of their resolution comes by determining the degree of the values
constitutive of personhood at stake’’ (Griffin 2008, p. 68). The independence of the moral
approach vis-a`-vis the law is well summarized by Tasioulas in a recent contribution:
‘‘human rights are to be identified by the use of natural reason, principally ordinary, truth-
oriented moral reasoning, as opposed to the artificial reason of some institution, such as
law (…)’’ (Tasioulas 2015, p. 2).
The initial reaction of the political camp was not to argue that the project pursued by the
moral camp is flawed per se, but that it does not help identify what is normatively salient
about the emerging ‘‘global practice of human rights’’ (Beitz 2009, p. 134). Beitz, in
particular, suggests that one ought to ‘‘understand the concept of human rights by asking
for what kinds of actions, in what kinds of circumstances, human rights claims may be
understood to give reasons’’ (Beitz 2009, pp. 7–8). Beitz then identifies a number of
‘‘paradigms of implementation’’ (Beitz 2009, pp. 33–40) that have constituted the core of
the global practice of human rights before turning to the question of their normative force.
Beitz, however, marks a radical shift from the moral approach in denying that the kind of
independent moral reasoning a` la Griffin is necessary to account for their normative
practice. In Beitz’ words, ‘‘there is no assumption a prior or independent layer of funda-
mental rights whose nature and content can be discovered independently of a consideration
of the place of human rights in the international realm (…) (Beitz 2009, p. 102). This is due
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to the plurality of interests that human rights protect in practice and ‘‘it does not seem
necessary to identify a list of relatively specific interests or values to serve as the grounds
or subject-matters of human rights’’ (Beitz 2009, pp. 139–34).
In response, the moral camp has established (convincingly, in my view) that recon-
structing the discursive function of human rights a` la Beitz does not necessarily imply
rejecting moral reasoning: if human rights are distinctive, as Beitz suggests, in that their
violation pro tanto triggers some form of international concern [from coercive intervention
to domestic contestation (Ibid., pp. 40–45)], it seems that it is part of such a political
account to explain why some rights (their violation) and not others trigger such concern.
This is the argument put forward by Renzo in a recent article: ‘‘if it is true that human
rights play the special role that political theories attribute to them (be that of justifying
political legitimacy, limiting state sovereignty, or triggering particular responses when
violated), there must be something that explains why they can play this role’’ (Renzo 2015,
p. 130). Put differently, it is not enough to identify the kind of action(s) that human rights
trigger—which rights generate those responses—and claim that those responses do not fit
the moral conception of human rights. However, to claim that moral reasoning is required
is one thing. To assume that this reasoning amounts to the kind of moral reasoning a` la
Griffin is another. I shall illustrate this point by reconstructing the reasons that HRL courts
give for their judgments.
Before doing that, it is important to note that practice-focused theorists, such as Beitz,
do not address HRL and ICs in great length either. Beitz, for instance, explicitly attaches
human rights to a political rather than legal paradigm of implementation. In fact, the lack
of legality explains why the emerging global human rights practice does not qualify as a
‘‘regime’’ in his view (Beitz 2009, p. 40). This view is flawed, in my view, because Beitz
apprehends the practice in the absence of a global legal system of sanction and/or judicial
review. As Besson rightly puts it, ‘‘very schematically, international law has been, alter-
natively and in a stark contrast, entirely assimilated either into ethics by international
natural lawyers or into a sum of state interests by realist, postmodern, or voluntarist
international lawyers’’ (Besson 2012, p. 214). In particular, regional and domestic forms of
human rights adjudication, such as the developed systems of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and of the ECtHR, are often mentioned but very rarely explored. In those
contexts, a Beitzian approach to HRL would need to examine the distinctively legal actions
that human rights trigger. Analogous to ‘‘international intervention’’ (Rawls 2001; Raz
2010) or ‘‘international concern’’ (Beitz 2009), the judgments of supranational courts
induce national courts and domestic institutions to reform the legal order accordingly, to
pay awards to victims, to initiate criminal proceedings, or even to re-open proceedings
after the rendition of a judgment (Besson 2011; Huneeus 2013). I return to the legal
practice in Sect. 3.
There is, however, an emerging political approach to HRL that applies to judicial
practice specifically. Kumm has recently offered a sophisticated normative account of the
proportionality test—the last step of constitutional and HRL review, when courts define
legitimate grounds for interfering with rights—as establishing ‘‘a test of public reason’’
(Kumm 2015, p. 16) in order for both HRL but also constitutional courts to be conferred
legitimate authority. Following Rawlsian tenets of political legitimacy, Kumm emphasizes
‘‘that human rights adjudicating courts are best understood as policing the boundaries of
the reasonable, not the boundaries of justice. Participants of the democratic process should
aspire to justice, but human rights courts do not review whether they succeed in that
endeavour. The bar is set lower, by focusing merely on reasonableness understood as the
justifiability in terms of public reason’’ (Kumm 2015, p. 20). That is why ‘‘[h]uman rights
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simultaneously stand above politics and are at the heart of the political process’’ (Kumm
2015, p. 27). In conformity with Rawlsian premises, the reasons that ought to prevail in
authoritative processes of law and politics should be neutral with respect to one’s com-
prehensive account of the good (Rawls 1971). In this sense, Kumm’s account illustrates the
political view and the ethically neutral reasons that should be invoked to determine the
content and scope of HRL. The political approach precisely excludes foundationalism a` la
Griffin.
2.2 International Criminal Law Theory
Let me now turn to the moral/political divide as it applies to ICLT. As already outlined, the
underlying normative question here concerns the nature of the wrong of (international)
crimes and the derived community to which perpetrators of those crimes ought to account.
This debate hence endorses Duff’s view that criminal responsibility implies calling the
wrongdoer to account (i.e., to give reasons) to justify his conduct. This is responsibility as
answerability. The wrongdoer is identified ‘‘not merely as an object of inquiry, but as
subject, an agent who is called (through he cannot of course be forced) to take part in a
rational process of proof and argument’’ (Duff 2007, p. 225). Therefore, to call to account
implies assigning the wrongdoer a certain normative status—what Duff calls a ‘‘norma-
tively laden description’’ (Duff 2007, p. 228). It follows that the institution of the criminal
procedure is an artefact. Rather than embodying an independent moral view, it coerces in
the name of a political community based on the terms to which we all have (hypothetically)
consented. More precisely, Duff’s account is premised on the category of citizenship. In
this sense, Duff’s own account illustrates the political approach. We are criminally
answerable to our fellow citizens only to the extent that the wrongs committed fall within
the terms of this artificial political community. As Duff puts it, ‘‘the law by which we are
bound should not be one imposed on us by a sovereign: it should be a ‘‘common law’’—a
law which is our law, which speaks to us in our collective voice in terms of the values by
which define ourselves as a polity’’ (Duff 2007, pp. 231–232).
Duff’s accountability model allows him to avoid the problem of vigilantism with which
other theories of criminal law [such as Luban’s explicit adoption of ‘‘vigilante jurisdiction’’
in ICL (Luban 2004)] are concerned. If the criminal law is not relative to a particular
normative community but simply follows the structure of moral wrongs across a variety of
communities, then it is unclear why the state (or a state-derived entity in ICL) remains the
exclusive jurisdiction. As Thorburn puts it, ‘‘we might be answerable to our private moral
communities—friends and colleagues, religious communities, and social clubs—for certain
wrongs we commit, but those private communities do not have the legitimate authority to
impose coercive punishment on us for our wrongs in the same way the state routinely does
through the criminal justice system’’ (Thorburn 2012, p. 86). Therefore, the criminal law is
only concerned with public norms—‘‘its proper concern is with the wrongs that we commit
within that civic enterprise’’ (Duff 2007, p. 234). As I explain in Sect. 4, the same problem
of vigilantism arises for the moral approach to ICL.
Now, the premise that the criminal law is not an institutional embodiment of the moral
law erodes at the international level in Duff’s view. This does not mean that the archi-
tecture of Duff’s answerability model outlined earlier changes. Rather, the authorized
jurisdictions of ICL (the ICC, Special Tribunals, or national courts applying through
universal jurisdiction) are still viewed as institutional mechanisms to call wrongdoers to
account. And wrongdoers are, again, called to account not just as objects of inquiry but as
agents of reason and justification—‘‘we respond to his wrongdoing, however terrible and
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‘inhuman’ it was, not by simply destroying him but by trying to bring him to answer for it’’
(Duff 2010, p. 604). Yet it remains unclear to which community perpetrators of interna-
tional crimes should account. This is because the basic normative status posited at the
domestic level, namely citizenship, does not naturally extend to the international level.
There is little evidence that the rights, duties, and institutional structures that justify and
realize citizenship exist beyond state boundaries. In Duff’s terms,
An answer must show that the court acts in the name of some group to whom the
defendant is answerable for its alleged crimes. It is not enough to argue that the
wrongs he allegedly committed are terrible wrongs whose perpetrators ought to be
punished: the trial’s legitimacy depends upon the acceptability of the court’s claim to
act in the name of those who have the right to call the defendant to account. In whose
name, then, can the ICC claim to act? (Duff 2010, p. 598)
This is precisely the question to which the moral and the political approaches provide
distinct answers. Duff himself oscillates between the two. On the one hand, he
contemplates the idea that the ICC embodies the institutions of the state in which the
horrendous acts were committed. The reason for not fully endorsing this view, however, is
that those institutions are missing precisely because of the consequences of the conflict and
atrocities: ‘‘there might be doubt about whether there exists a political community to which
the perpetrator could answer, on whose behalf the international court could claim to act’’
(Duff 2010, p. 599). On the other hand, Duff considers the view that the relevant
community at the international level is humanity: ‘‘we can see the creation of the ICC as
one of the ways in which the moral ideal of a human community might be given more
determinate and effective institutional form (…)’’ (Duff 2010, p. 601).
With a view to develop the moral approach, Renzo has further developed the latter
answer by offering a revisionist account of crimes against humanity (hereafter, CAH)
(based on Article 7 of the Rome Statute). More specifically, Renzo argues that no element
pertaining to legal structure should count as a necessary condition of CAH. As it stands, the
definition of the Rome Statute requires that the constitutive acts meet two qualifying
clauses. In addition to their particularly atrocious nature (16 major multiple offences
including murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, rape, etc.), CAH must,
first, be committed ‘‘as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack’’ (Art. 7(1)). The definition therefore
requires that the crimes are not isolated offenses but form part of a large attack on a civilian
population. Second, Art. 7(2)(a) specifies what drafters meant by ‘‘attack directed against
any civilian population’’: ‘‘a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts
referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a
State or organizational policy to commit such attack’’. Those ‘‘chapeaux’’ are precisely
taken to distinguish international crimes from domestic ones more generally (Haque 2012).
Now, Renzo argues that both clauses are not necessary to meet the threshold of CAH,
because those clauses are not what make CAH normatively distinctive. Rather, Renzo
answers the question of distinctiveness exclusively by examining one or the other con-
stitutive acts of CAH (murder, rape, deportation, etc.) in isolation (hence separately from
any legal or judicial qualification) and argues that each of those acts alone denies the
‘‘dignity’’ of human beings. Those acts are distinctive in that they show ‘‘a lack of respect
and concern that we [individuals] owe to our fellow human beings qua human beings’’
(Renzo 2012, p. 456). While Renzo admits that he does not have a full-fledged account of
‘‘dignity,’’ he heavily relies on recent work in HRT and endorses the view defended by the
moral camp reviewed earlier. One radical implication of this revisionist project is that even
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ordinary and isolated acts of murder or rape should qualify and trigger the applicability of
ICL (by national courts for practical reasons). Equipped with this independent account of
the wrong of CAH, Renzo returns to the question of community posed by Duff. To this
question, Renzo contends that dignity creates a universal moral community to which
violators are to be held accountable. CAH become ‘‘wrongs for which we are account-
able to our fellow human beings in virtue of the membership in the wider community of
humanity’’ (Renzo 2012, p. 456). This allows seeing that, although the core question of
criminal responsibility remains stable—the identification of the relevant community of
ICL—the moral approach deploys the same foundationalist approach as in HRT.
To conclude this section, I hope to have shown, first, that beyond the positive speci-
ficities of HRL and ICL as well as the conceptual features of right and crime, similar
resources of normative theorizing are at play. More precisely, the moral approach consists
in specifying, through substantive moral reasoning, the non-derivative status or value
protected by HRL and ICL. My review of Renzo’s account indicated that this approach to
HRT can also inform the answer to the core normative question of ICLT. Yet, as Besson
puts it (in the HRT context), ‘‘there is nothing in the inquiry into the justifications of human
rights that necessarily implies foundationalism’’ (Besson 2014, p. 36). The political
approach offers an entirely distinct framework: whether domestic or international, the
normative criterion to determine the appropriate content and justification of both HRL and
ICL should remain ethically neutral and hence justifiable from reasonably different views.
Second, I have observed that the role and practice of ICs adjudicating HRL and ICL is
quasi-absent from the normative literature. We have seen that Kumm does provide a
principled (political) account for conducting the proportionality test in HRL, but does not
put his account to the test by looking at the concrete practices of HRL. In the next section, I
examine selected portions of international judicial practice with a view to testing the
moral/political distinction.
3 Incorporating the Practice of International Courts
At this point, it is important to recall why examining judicial practices might be relevant
for the purpose of this article. We have seen that the moral camp is particularly dismissive
of those. The reasons are contingent but nonetheless serious. On the one hand, the growing
(sometimes exponential, as in the case of the ECtHR) caseload of ICs in conjunction with
to the open-ended character of treaty provisions implied that, from their inceptions, courts
and tribunals of HRL and ICL have faced fierce normative choices. Is the prohibition
against torture an absolute right? Does the right to free elections imply a right to refer-
endum? The text of HRL treaties and conventions is irremediably vague. In the same vein,
international tribunals have similarly specified the kinds of conduct that amount to inter-
national crimes. Can non-state agents commit crimes against humanity? Who counts as the
‘‘most responsible’’? On the other hand, it is now widely accepted that HRL and ICL courts
have addressed those questions without much help from conventional (positivist) theories
of adjudication (Letsas 2010; Regan 2010). Those two premises converge in raising the
question of legitimacy: which normative considerations underpin the ICs’ reasoning and
what do those normative considerations change to their claim to legitimate authority? In
this section, I reconstruct how ICs have articulated the content and limits of some core
provisions, and then test them against the moral/political distinction.
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3.1 The ECtHR and Its Notion of ‘‘Democratic Society’’
Let me first zoom in on the ‘‘crown-jewel of the world’s most advanced systems’’ (Helfer
2008, p. 125) of human rights protection, the ECtHR, which holds compulsory jurisdiction
over 47 European states. I jump straight to a quite specific but decisive context of its
adjudication, namely the proportionality test and, within that test, the last of step of
balancing. In accordance with the text of the European Convention on Human Rights
(hereafter, ECHR), the ECtHR must determine whether the interference found was nev-
ertheless ‘‘necessary in a democratic society’’ (cf. Sadurski 2015). This test concerns in
particular the derogable rights of the ECtHR, namely Articles 8–11 (privacy, thought and
religion, expression, assembly). The balancing phase of the test is highly informative for
my purpose, as it requires the ECtHR to determine the more precise content and limits of
rights (in a notoriously short convention) against competing considerations and allocate a
potential margin of appreciation to states. It should also be recalled that the Preamble to
the ECtHR, unlike the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its reference to ‘‘in-
herent dignity,’’ does not refer to substantive foundations beyond ‘‘a common heritage of
political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law’’ (Preamble of the ECHR).
Does the ECtHR rely on moral or political considerations when striking the balance? I
argue that the ECtHR has appealed to distinctively democratic considerations to define the
content and limits of those rights—thereby specifying the political approach to HRT.
Rather than confining the notion of ‘‘democratic society’’ to its formal aspect (the will of
the majority), the ECtHR has articulated a substantive notion of democracy whose core
tenet is the inclusion and traction of the interests and views of all subjects subjected to state
authority. In so doing, the ECtHR might be viewed as acting in the name of the equal
political status of individuals in their respective political community. This deliberative
notion of democracy then helps the ECtHR sort out which rights, duties, and duty-holders
should prevail (e.g., expression and reunion) in the proportionality test. Moreover, this
notion helps explain why controversial provisions and obligations fall within the respon-
dent state’s jurisdiction. This justifies not scrutinizing certain provisions in depth (in
particularly, privacy and religion, as we shall see), leaving it to the state to balance rights
through a wide margin of appreciation.
Let me offer an overview of this distinction. With regard to Article 10 (expression), for
instance, the ECtHR requires states not only to refrain from interfering with views and
opinions expressed in the course of a public debate. It also demands—through positive
obligations—that states promote contradictory and adversarial deliberations (on issues of
public interest). Those views and opinions may deeply ‘‘offend, shock and disturb’’
(Handyside v. United Kingdom, para. 50). For instance, the ECtHR has derived ‘‘a right to
be informed of plural perspectives’’ (Erdog˘du and I˙nce v. Turkey, para. 51) on issues of
public interest. In both cases, the ECtHR holds that ‘‘such are the demands of pluralism,
tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society’’’ (Handy-
side v. United Kingdom, §50). This suggests that freedom of expression inheres in the
distinctively political status conferred to individuals in a democratic society, and hence in
the respect to the pluralism and profound disagreement that may arise in democratic
processes. The ECtHR explicitly holds that ‘‘more generally, freedom of political debate is
at the very core of the concept of a democratic society which prevails throughout the
Convention’’ (Lingens v. Austria, para. 42).
The same emphasis applies to how the ECtHR understands Article 11 (reunion and
association). The role devoted to political parties and the conditions of their dissolution are
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quite illustrative in this respect. Since pluralism and disagreement is at least as pervasive
among individuals as among political parties, the sufficient conditions for dissolving a
party should be stringent. In United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, in
which the Turkish Communist Party was dissolved by Turkey’s constitutional court, the
ECtHR held that ‘‘there can be no justification for hindering a political group solely
because it seeks to debate in public the situation of part of the State’s population and to
take part in the nation’s political life in order to find, according to democratic rules,
solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned’’ (United Communist Party of Turkey
and Others v. Turkey, para. 57). It emphasizes that a party should be dissolved only when
the party in question has a real chance to seize power and endanger the democratic process
itself once in office (notably by not respecting pluralism (Refah Partisi and Others v.
Turkey, para. 87). Here again, the ECtHR relies on distinctively democratic considerations
to set the more precise limits of derogable rights (see Zysset 2016a).
Yet, this predominant reasoning does not apply to all derogable rights. The ECtHR
considers that delineating the precise contours of the right to private life (Article 8) and
freedom of thought and religion (Article 9) fall outside its interpretive authority. It
explicitly invokes the pervading disagreement among state parties over those rights’
content and scope to justify its judicial restraint. For instance, the ECtHR has not (yet)
specified what exactly constitutes a religious belief under Article 9. It notably held that
‘‘the question whether or not Scientology may be described as a ‘religion’ is a matter of
controversy among the member States. It is clearly not the Court’s task to decide in
abstract whether or not a body of beliefs and related practices may be considered a
‘religion’ within the meaning of Article 9 of the Convention’’ (Kimlya and Others v.
Russia, para. 79). As a result, those rights are more subject to a consensualist framework:
the ECtHR screens practices at the national level and adjusts the level of protection based
on the level of consensus among those practices. It is hence crucial to see the differential
treatment between the two sets of rights: while the ECtHR adduces the content and fixes
the limits of Article 10 and 11 by binding them to a normative notion of ‘‘democratic
society’’, it defers the same exercise to state parties with regard to Article 8 and 9.
How can the moral/political distinction developed earlier help interpret the reasoning of
the ECtHR? I suggest that the ECtHR is concerned with the distinctive role of public
authorities of which this court is itself an instance. More precisely, it views those
authorities as legitimate only if they equally address the interests of those subjects to its
rule and justifies its decisions without appealing to a comprehensive ethical view of the
applied norms. This view, as we have seen, has a particular resonance in the democratic
context and the deliberative procedure that precedes the vote. The prevalence of pluralism
and disagreement remains a core premise. In the words of Christiano, democrats ‘‘ac-
knowledge fundamental conflicts of interests and convictions in society and assert that
because of this lack of consensus, each person may demand an equal share in political
rule’’ (Christiano 2003, p. 39). Democratic legitimacy therefore depends on tracking the
opinions of all its subjects and this particularly concerns the treatment of minorities at the
deliberative stage. In that sense, expressing views and opinions that ‘‘shock, disturb and
divide,’’ as the ECtHR calls it, contributes to the public justifiability of the democratic
outcome and, consequently, to the legitimacy of the authority upholding it. As Christiano
puts it, ‘‘the thought is that when an outcome is democratically chosen and some people
disagree with the outcome, as some inevitably will, they still have a duty to go along with
the decision because otherwise they would be treating the others unfairly’’ (Christiano
2013, Sect. 7). Conversely, while the ECtHR does minimally protect freedom of religion
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(e.g., the curtailment of worship places in Cyprus v. Turkey), it does not exercise authority
beyond the overlapping consensus prevailing among its subjects.
3.2 International Criminal Tribunals and The Notion of ‘‘Organization’’
Without much transition, let me turn to the practice of ICL. For the sake of concision, I
restrict my investigation to the category of CAH. In the Rome Statute, CAH refers to 16
major and multiple offenses including murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
torture, rape, etc. In addition, the definition comprises two ‘‘chapeaux,’’ that is, qualifying
clauses detailing the circumstances of the wrongful conduct. Analogous to the ECtHR and
its ‘‘democratic society,’’ the ICC adduces the content and limits of international crimes
based on contextual considerations. Indeed, rather than exploring the acts constitutive of
CAH, ICs have explored the nature and capacities of the agent who commits the crime in
order to circumscribe wrongful conduct and the enabling conditions that make interna-
tional crimes distinct from domestic crimes.
As far as the contextual element of CAH is concerned (the requirement of a ‘‘wide-
spread or systematic’’ attack preceding the crimes), the ICC held in the Bemba case that the
attack must be ‘‘massive, frequent, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness
and directed against a multiplicity of victims’’ (Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo,
para. 88). More importantly, it held that the attack must be ‘‘made by groups of persons
who govern a specific territory or by any organization with the capability to commit a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population’’ (Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, para. 83). This implies for the agent of CAH the ability to alter the
condition of its subjects at will (including killing them) over a certain time period (before,
during, and after the odious acts). This is in line with Darryl Robinson’s suggestion that the
‘‘‘systematic’ branch of the definition ‘focuses not only on the organized nature of the
activity but also on the character of the entity organizing it’’’ (Robinson 2011). Hence the
perpetrator’s identity-type is defined neither by its formal nature (state or non-state) nor
limited to the capacity to commit a multiplicity of odious acts (murder, rape, deportation,
enslavement, etc.) but by the capacity to control an entire territory (hence the people) on
which the attack eventually occurs. This capacity clearly makes the agent of CAH akin to
state or state-like authority.
The second clause of a ‘‘State or organizational policy’’ behind the attack has also been
specified in judicial law based on the distinctive capacities of the agent. To determine
whether a group qualifies as an organization within the meaning of Article (2)(a), the ICC
held that it must determine ‘‘whether the group possesses, in fact, the means to carry out a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population’’ (Situation in the Republic of
Kenya, para. 90). This standard was also taken by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter, ICTY) in Prosecutor v. Tadic´, where the ad hoc tribunal
held that ‘‘if the acts occur on a widespread or systematic basis [, then] that demonstrates a
policy to commit those acts, whether formalized or not’’ (Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic´, para.
653). In addition, the ICTY made clear that the agent neither needs to be a state agent nor
even a state-sponsored agent; it can just be tolerated by the state. The same tribunal also
held in the Prosecutor v. Kordic´ case that the policy element does not need to be explicit or
definite but that it remains an ‘‘important indicative factor’’ (Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic´,
para. 181–182).
In the more recent Kenya situation, the ICC held that the existence of a policy should
still play a role and should be derived from a series of particular events including ‘‘the
establishment and implementation of autonomous political structures at any level of
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authority in a given territory (…)’’ and ‘‘the establishment and implementation of auton-
omous military structures (…)’’ (Situation in the Republic of Kenya, para. 87). Here again,
it appears that the class of agents who satisfy the clause is identified not only by the
constitutive acts committed but by the wide range of coercive action(s) that it is capable to
undertake on a given territory and its people. Consequently, the policy element can be
simply inferred from the widespread and systematic test as an ‘‘improbability of coinci-
dence’’ (Robinson 2013, pp. 9–10) As Robinson further explains, ‘‘the request for direct
evidence of formal adoption of a policy is contrary to past jurisprudence, which consis-
tently emphasizes that a policy need not be formally adopted and can be inferred from the
manner in which the acts occur’’ (Robinson 2013, p. 13). This is also confirmed by
Rodenha¨user in a recent study of the ICC’s case law: ‘‘by interpreting the organizational
requirement in its context, the chamber found that it is the capacities—meaning the means,
resources, and co-ordination capabilities—of the group that are decisive’’ (Rodenha¨user
2014, p. 923).
The intermediate conclusion to be drawn is that if CAH do not necessarily imply a
legally recognized state, it does imply a state or state-like authority. This conclusion does
not overlook the basic premise that only individuals may be liable for ICL violations (e.g.,
Article 25 of the Rome Statue). In fact, recent research on individual liability for collective
crimes precisely highlights the apparatus over which the perpetrator must exercise control
(as part of the subjective element). In the words of Jain, ‘‘it is the person who occupies the
central position in this collective part of the offence who is most interest to us, rather than
the one who controls the individual micro offence’’ (Jain 2014, p. 141). But what makes
this authority or control significant must come from a normative evaluation—this is where
the normative theory of CAH matters. Can the moral/political distinction help interpret the
tribunals’ reasoning? Here again, the capacity-based account articulated above invites us to
think about the legitimate role of state or state-like agents, and how the agent of CAH
deeply and atrociously perverts this role. The core idea of ‘‘role inversion’’ has been
brilliantly ascertained Luban (2004) and Vernon. Vernon for instance argues that the triad
of ‘‘administrative capacity, local authority and territoriality’’ (Vernon 2002, p. 243)
reveals the travesty of states when they attack their subjects: ‘‘when, therefore, they play an
essential role in an attack on a group of a state’s subjects, that group is absolutely worse off
than it could be in the worst-case scenario of statelessness’’ (Vernon 2002, p. 243).
From the subjects’ standpoint, however, if one just considers the odious acts without
their enabling conditions, then the idea of role inversion loses its significance: ‘‘to be
enslaved or tortured or killed by a state is not very different from suffering the same thing
at the hands of a sadist or serial killer’’ (Vernon 2013, p. 230). We therefore need to more
precisely explain where and how the perversion occurs from a subject’s perspective (in
addition to the odious acts, of course). I contend that what makes states normatively
distinctive, from the subjects’ standpoint, is that those subjects do not constantly need to
evaluate the soundness of the state’s actions and directives with regard to the basic domain
of states’ authority, namely territorial control and the monopoly on violence. This quality
obtains by systematically issuing directives that help subjects better comply with the
reasons that apply to them [according to Raz’ concept of authority (Raz 2006)]. Viewing
CAH through this lens more precisely reveals the extent to which the agent of CAH
perverts the subjects’ relation to political authority (Zysset 2016b). While the agent of
CAH strikingly mirrors the systematic and pre-emptive role of the state, public authority is
established to massively persecute, terrorize, and finally odiously attack subjects.
As explained in the Introduction, the moral/political distinction does not alter the
underlying understanding of crime adopted throughout the paper (Duff’s answerability
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model). It rather suggests different placeholders in this pre-established model. To recall,
Duff’s central question is the one of standing—that ‘‘the court acts in the name of some
group to whom the defendant is answerable for its alleged crimes’’ (Duff 2010, p. 598). In
refining the class of perpetrators of CAH as those agents holding the authoritative role of
the state, I suggest a modified answer to the question of community. Surely, individuals
remain the ultimate holders of normative value. But the kind of community at stake here is
created by the duties that agents exercising state or state-like authority owe to their subjects
just in virtue of the authority being exercised. The sole fact of holding a monopoly over
territorial control and deploying large-scale coercive resources should serve the interest of
their subjects in physical security. The class of perpetrators of CAH is therefore defined by
the function of this authority, not its formal features (e.g., whether this authority is the
official one).
4 Conclusion: From Human Rights Law to International Criminal Law
and Back
I started this article with two neglected issues in the normative theory of international law.
First, how and to what extent do normative debates in HRT and ICLT mirror each other,
and what does the mirror exactly reflect? Second, which of the moral and political
approaches best illuminates the practice of ICs? Having surveyed those limited practices
and outlined how the political approach may best reconstruct it, I am now in a position
offer a more abstract response to those two questions by bridging the two areas (HRT and
ICLT) both theoretically and empirically. To recall, the key principle of the political view
developed in this article is that the exercise of authority, in order to be conferred legiti-
macy, must equally serve the freedom and equality of its subjects without privileging a
comprehensive ethical view of what (international) law precisely embodies. I suggest
viewing international law as illustrating the second conception. In so doing, ICs sub-
sidiarily act in the name of domestic authorities. It is legitimizing in furthering the public
justifiability of public authority vis-a`-vis individuals. As explained in the Introduction, it
crucial to see that I adopt a basic Razian account of rights and a Duffian account of
crime—that may be assessed on their own terms—and that my own contribution amounts
to specifying those accounts in the more specific fields of HRT and ICLT and with
reference to the practices reviewed.
In ICLT, it is by virtue of occupying (and perverting) a certain role—the exercise of
public authority—that those agents become answerable to the international community for
committing atrocious crimes. Rather than answering to humanity, I suggest viewing sus-
pected perpetrators of CAH as answering to a community of responsible states. This
political account of ICLT can then better explain why only state or state-derived agents
(the ICC, Special Tribunals, national courts) can claim jurisdiction. In contrast, Luban
develops the concept of ‘‘vigilante jurisdiction’’ (Luban 2004, p. 137) to extend the scope
of the relevant jurisdiction to virtually any institutional structure that meets certain pro-
cedural criteria (‘‘natural justice’’). In contrast, my reconstruction of CAH coherently
identifies the prosecuting entity to the entity being prosecuted. ICs subsidiarily take action
on behalf of the failing state and thereby re-affirm their basic duties qua state or state-like
authorities. When states in which CAH occur are unwilling or unable to prosecute and
punish, the community of states calls its responsible members to account and organize an
extra-territorial trial in the name of their common membership. I therefore suggest viewing
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extra-territorial jurisdiction as doing justice not only to the victims (by proving the crimes)
but also to the accused perpetrator by treating him as responsible member of the normative
community of states—in Duff’s words, ‘‘we respond to his wrongdoing, however terrible
and ‘inhuman’ it was, not by simply destroying him, but by trying to bring him to answer
for it’’ (Duff 2010, p. 604).
In HRT, the interest sufficient to hold others (namely, public authorities) under a duty
pertains to the individuals’ equal political status in their political community. This status
minimally requires addressing their equal say in the process of collective (democratic)
deliberation. I have shown that the ECtHR emphasizes the rights, duties, and duty-bearers
that are necessary for this process to unfold. The ECtHR’s ‘‘democratic society’’ distin-
guishes those conditions that are ‘‘mutually justifiable’’ (Forst 2010) while leaving to the
state a margin of appreciation when the question at hand reaches beyond an overlapping
consensus. Here again, the authority held by this IC is justified in practice on distinctively
political grounds. This allows foreseeing the common core between HRL and ICL:
although each applies to a different stage of the political process, and despite that their
operations differ, the normative grounds for upholding the two regimes are continuous;
they have to do with the basic duties that public authorities (state or state-like) owe to their
subjects as political equals. Clearly, this common core may justify other norms that fall
outside the realm of HRL and ICL. HRL and ICL, I submit, form necessary conditions
because they concern the threats that public authorities themselves pose to the basic
freedom and equality of their subjects.
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